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Abstract. Digitally signing a digital document is a straightforward
procedure; however, when the digital document contains dynamic con-
tent, the digital signature may remain valid but the viewed document
may not be the same as the document when viewed by the signer.
Other similar problems exist even with ‘static’ documents, if the ap-
pearance of a document can be changed. In this paper, we consider
previously proposed solutions for such problems, and propose a new
solution. Unresolved issues and problems are also discussed.
Keywords: Digital Signature, e-commerce, e-Document, Security
1 Introduction
Digitally signing a digital document is a straightforward procedure, and dig-
ital signatures (see, for example (Menezes et al. 1997, Chapter 11)) are a
very important cryptographic primitive. Both national and international
standards for signatures exist, including the US Digital Signature Standard
(DSS) (National Institute of Standards and Technology 2000), which speci-
fies a suite of recommended algorithms, and two multi-part ISO/IEC stan-
dards, ISO/IEC 9796 and ISO/IEC 14888. The main security services that
can be provided by a digital signature are: message integrity, origin authen-
tication, and non-repudiation. It is important to note that all the existing
standards for signatures, including the DSS and the ISO/IEC standards, are
concerned with which algorithms to use and not the form of the data that
is signed.
As pointed out by Kain et al. (Kain et al. 2002), digital documents with
dynamic content may cause a problem for the digital signature verification
process. This paper tries to address some of the problems that arise when
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signing digital documents that contain dynamic content. It does not discuss
other digital signature security problems such as Trojan Horses or securing
the Digital Signature workstation, as discussed, for example, in (Spalka
et al. 2001a, Weber 1998).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces
the problem of signing digital documents with dynamic content. Section 3
discusses possible locations for signature functionality in a computer system.
Existing solutions to the problems discussed in Section 2 are introduced in
Section 4. A novel solution is discussed in Section 5. Finally, issues and
unresolved problems are discussed in Section 6.
2 The Signature Interpretation Problem
In order for a program to generate a digital signature on a data structure,
e.g. a document, it must first encode it as a serial string of bits and bytes.
It is then expected that the signature will unambiguously commit the signer
to the contents of this serialized document. However, ambiguities can arise
in the interpretation of the data string when this string can be viewed differ-
ently by the signer and the verifier of the signature. That is, it is possible to
sign a digital document that changes when viewed at a later time, without
invalidating the digital signature. One way in which this problem can arise
is when the digital document being signed contains dynamic content.
As an example, suppose that the creator of the digital document is dif-
ferent from the signer. The creator produces the document in such a way
that it gives the signer the impression that what he is about to sign is what
is being displayed. However, the creator may embed dynamic content, e.g.
macros or JavaScript, in the document to change its displayed contents when
viewed at a later time. Kain et al. (Kain et al. 2002) describe the problem
and gave some examples using MS Word, MS Excel, PDF files, as well as
HTML documents.
A different source of ambiguities in digitally signed documents was dis-
cussed by Jøsang et al. (Jøsang et al. 2002). Jøsang et al. show how font
substitution can be used to display the same digital document with different
meanings on different computers.
Whilst there are no doubt yet further ways in which ambiguities can
be deliberately or accidentally introduced into digital documents, the main
focus of this paper is problems arising from dynamic content. This is a
significant and growing problem — whether we like it or not, document
formats appear to be becoming more complex and more dynamic, rather
than less so. Of course, this enables many new features to be provided
to users; this appears to be yet another area where user convenience and
security are pulling in opposite directions.
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3 Signature functionality
Signature functionality can be integrated into a specific application or im-
plemented as a stand-alone application, see Figure 1. If digital signature
functionality is integrated into an application, the application is aware of
the document format and could be designed to avoid possible digital sig-
nature interpretation issues arising from dynamic content. Moreover, the
application could act as a “trusted viewer” for the digital document. How-
ever, this is not really a viable general approach, since including signature
functionality in every application is potentially very inefficient, with signifi-
cant associated key management issues.
On the other hand, when a stand-alone signature application is used,
the problem of dynamic content can be much more serious, since the digital
signature program is typically not aware of the format of the document
being signed. One way of avoiding this problem would be to enable the
signing application to communicate with the application which understands
the document format. This idea forms the basis of the scheme we propose in
Section 5 below. Of course, the security of the signing process also relies on
the integrity and secrecy of the private signing key and controls to limit its
use. The private key must thus be protected in some way, e.g. by storing it
in a security module such as a smart card and requiring entry of a password
to enable its use.
Application
Document
B. Stand alone Digital Signature functionality
Application Application
Digital signature
Document
DS functionality
A. Application integrated Digital Signature functionality 
Figure 1: Location of digital signature functionality in a computer system
4 Existing Solutions
In this section, previously proposed solutions to the problem of signing dig-
ital documents possessing dynamic content are briefly reviewed. Interest-
ingly, all these solutions fall into the second category discussed above, i.e.
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they apply to the case where signature functionality is included in a stand-
alone application.
4.1 Disabling dynamic content
Disabling dynamic or active content, as proposed by Spalka et al. (Spalka
et al. 2001b), is one solution to this problem. However, this solution may
render some documents useless. Spalka et al. propose two further ways to
solve the problem of dynamic content. One is to restrict the actions of active
content instead of disabling it, although this would require re-engineering
every application. The other approach is to use a ‘secure viewer’ to view
signed documents, but this would require the viewer to be able to parse
every possible document format (see also Section 4.4).
4.2 Static file formats
In this approach, only predefined static file formats, known not to have
dynamic content, are permitted to be signed. For example, plain ASCII files
have no dynamic content, so the digital signature program can sign them
without worrying about ambiguity issues. However, this may mean that
only one file format can be digitally signed, because most digital document
formats permit some sort of dynamic content. This approach may be useful
in situations where all digital documents to be signed have no dynamic
content features, such as macros, JavaScript, or HTML capabilities.
4.3 XML
Another solution would be to convert the digital document to the Extensible
Markup Language (XML) format (W3C 2003) and then apply the XML
digital signature processing standard (Eastlake et al. 2002) to obtain the
document signature. This does appear to help to solve the problem, but
dynamic content may still exist in the XML version. When the document
is later presented to the signature verifier, if it is necessary to convert the
document back to its original form, the dynamic content may be re-activated.
The authors of the XML digital signature standard are aware of the prob-
lem of dynamic or active content. The standard states clearly that, in order
to sign an XML document, the signature program should sign all ‘external’
documents, i.e. documents referenced from within the XML document. The
following is a quote from the standard (Eastlake et al. 2002):
Just as a user should only sign what he or she“sees,” persons and
automated mechanism that trust the validity of a transformed
document on the basis of a valid signature should operate over
the data that was transformed (including canonicalization) and
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signed, not the original pre-transformed data. This recommen-
dation applies to transforms specified within the signature as
well as those included as part of the document itself. For in-
stance, if an XML document includes an embedded style sheet
[XSLT] it is the transformed document that should be repre-
sented to the user and signed. To meet this recommendation
where a document references an external style sheet, the content
of that external resource should also be signed via a signature
Reference, otherwise the content of that external content might
change which alters the resulting document without invalidating
the signature.
One problem with this solution is that the XML document may no longer
contain all the dynamic content of the original document. For instance, if
a Microsoft Excel document contains macros, then in order to avoid any
possible problems arising from such dynamic content, all macros should be
removed from the XML version. This will render the document useless if
there are macros that are needed to present the document to the user, or if
the user wants to make some changes to the document using the macros.
4.4 Document Parser
Another approach to solving the problem is to create a digital signature
program with its own document parser. That is, whenever the user wants to
sign a document, the digital signature program parses the digital document
and removes all dynamic content. In this approach, the digital signature
program will need to be aware of most, if not all, digital document formats,
which appears infeasible.
Thus, as it stands, this approach is impractical because of the need to
provide a document parser for every possible document formats. However,
it might be possible to provide a parser for the most popular document
format. Nevertheless, problems will still arise since not all document format
specifications are available, and the owners of proprietary document formats
often change the format with every release of their product.
4.5 Graphics version
The What You See Is What You Sign (WYSIWYS) concept (Scheibelhofer
2001) is designed to solve the ambiguity problem arising from signing dig-
ital documents with dynamic content. This approach works by creating a
graphical representation of the digital document and then digitally signing
it. That is the approach taken by a commercial product (Marketing 2003)
running under the Microsoft Windows operating system. It works as follows.
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1. When installing the digital signature program, it sets up a special
printer driver that functions like a normal printer, but, instead of
printing a document on paper, prints it to an image file.
2. The user requests the digital signature program to sign a document
by either printing the document to the digital signature special printer
from within the application program, or by launching the digital sig-
nature program and passing the document as an input. In the latter
case, the digital signature program, with the help of the operating
system printing subsystem, requests the application program to print
the document to the digital signature program special printer.
3. The digital signature program creates a static image of the document,
i.e. a graphical representation of the document, using a popular im-
age format, such as TIFF (.tif), bitmap (.bmp), or JPEG (.jpg). It is
worth noting that the digital signature program does not need to un-
derstand the format of the document to be signed. As stated above,
the static image is produced by requesting the application program
to print the document to the special digital signature printer driver
(using the operating system printing subsystem).
4. The user views the static image of the digital document and approves
it for signature.
5. The digital signature program then signs the static image of the doc-
ument. If necessary, the program can also sign the original document
and send it with the static image, but, and according to (Marketing
2003), this should not be used as a legal reference.
This approach appears to work well. However, it removes a lot of the
flexibility enjoyed in today’s business environment. Also, sending an image
potentially consumes a lot more bandwidth than just sending the digital
document.
5 A New Solution
In this section, we propose a new method to solve the problem of signing
digital documents with dynamic content. The solution works in a similar
way to the document parser solution outlined in Section 4.4. The main
difference is that our proposed solution passes the document parsing task
to the document generator program. This removes the need for the digital
signature program to be aware of the document format specifications in order
to generate a static version of the document, i.e. a version of the document
without dynamic content.
Furthermore, the solution is flexible in that it can handle document for-
mats introduced after the signing program was released. The solution as
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described here uses the Microsoft Component Object Model (COM) archi-
tecture (Box 1998); however, other component based architectures, such as
CORBA or Java, could also be used. The solution is based on two assump-
tions, as follows.
1. The verifier has access to the program that was used by the signer
to generate the digital document. In other words, both signer and
verifier have access to the COM object that can generate a ‘safe’ digital
document for the specific digital document type. For example, if the
signer is signing a document created by Microsoft Word, then the
verifier should also have access to Microsoft Word.
2. All programs that generate digital documents that may need to be
signed must be aware of the digital signature program, i.e. they must
possess application awareness. For example, in the Microsoft Windows
environment, this assumption can be met by registering the COM
component of the application responsible for creating a static version
of the document under a key in the Registry. We will discuss these
assumptions in more detail below.
5.1 Application awareness
In order for an application to be digital signature aware, it should meet the
following two requirements:
1. It must implement an object that exposes a COM interface to help the
digital signature program communicate with the application.
2. When installed, it must register itself in a predefined key location in the
Registry, i.e. the data repository in the Microsoft Windows environ-
ment in which most of the Windows settings and program information
are kept. The Registry location used must be specific to the digital
signature program. This will make it easier for the digital signature
program to locate digital signature aware applications.
Given that the application meets the above two requirements, the digital
signature program can consult the Registry and search for the application
that is associated with any digital document (using the file type indication
following the full stop in the file name). Once it has identified the applica-
tion that generated the document, it creates an instance of that application
and, using the digital signature COM interface, passes it the document and
requests it to generate a static representation of the document. In the next
two sections, we describe the processes of signing and verifying digital doc-
uments.
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Figure 2: Signing a digital document
5.2 Signing a digital document
To sign a digital document, the signer uses the relevant application to check
that the document appears correct. The digital signature program is then
invoked and is passed the document. The digital signature program performs
the following steps in order to sign the document, as shown in Figure 2.
1. The program consults the Registry and searches for the application
program that generated the document, using the document filename
extension as a key. It then obtains the Globally Unique ID (GUID)
of the application and creates an instance of the application in order
to get access to the digital signature interface. If the digital signature
program cannot find the GUID of the application responsible for cre-
ating the particular document type, the user should be warned, and
given the option of either signing the document or not.
2. The program sends the document to the identified application through
the digital signature COM interface that was acquired in step 1, and
requests it to parse the document and return it in a static form.
3. The signature program receives back the static form of the document
and signs it.
5.3 Verifying a signed document
In order to verify a digital signature on a document, the document, the
signature, and the signer’s public key are input to the signature program for
verification. After performing steps 1 and 2 as described in Section 5.2, the
signature program verifies the digital signature against the static version of
the document it received in step 2 and outputs a ‘true/false’ indicator. If
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the output value is true, then the signature is valid. Figure 3 illustrates the
process of verifying a digital signature on a document with dynamic content.
COM Interface
Digital Signature
Application
Signature verification process
Digital Signature +
Dynamic Document +
Signer’s Public Key
True/False indicator
Digital Signature
aware Application
Figure 3: Verifying a signed document
5.4 Security Analysis
We now briefly review some possible attacks on the scheme described im-
mediately above.
5.4.1 File type attacks
As discussed in Section 5.1, the application program must register the file
type extensions that it uses in a special location within the Registry, in
addition to the ‘regular’ extension registration process. Correct operation
of the proposed solution relies heavily on the correctness of both document
extensions and the file type/extension table held in the Registry. Apart
from ensuring that the application program possesses application awareness
of the digital signature program, the use of a special extension mapping
table minimises the risk of accidental changes to this table.
The document extension scheme could be attacked by taking advantage
of this reliance. One attack of this type would be to change the extension
of a document that is to be signed. For example, suppose that a docu-
ment is in Microsoft Word format, i.e. it has the extension .doc, and that
a malicious third party changes its extension to .txt, the extension for text
files. In order to sign the document, the digital signature program performs
all the steps discussed in section 5.2, and passes the document to the ap-
plication registered for handling text files. Since .txt files cannot contain
dynamic content, the application will simply return the unchanged file to
the signature program, which will sign it.
If an attacker can then change the document type back to .doc before
it is viewed by the signature verifier, then problems can clearly arise. If
the file contains dynamic content then the problem that the solution was
designed to avoid will recur on the verifier’s computer. The only way of
avoiding this problem is to prevent changes to the file type extension, which
can be achieved by including the file name within the scope of the digital
signature. However, even if such a precaution is enforced (and this would be
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our recommendation) problems can still arise if the extension/application
mapping table in the Registry can be modified, as we now describe.
Suppose an attacker can modify the signature program extension/application
association tables in the Registry of both the signer’s and the verifier’s com-
puter so that in both cases .doc files are processed by an application designed
to work with ASCII text files. Suppose, moreover, that the signer is given a
document to sign that contains dynamic content. When the signature pro-
gram passes it to the application to make a static version, no changes will
be made since the document will be treated as an ASCII text file. Exactly
the same will happen at the verifier, and the signature on the document
will thus be verified. However, when the verifier views the document using
Word, the dynamic content will be activated, and the usual problems with
dynamic content arise.
It should be noted that, as long as the file name (and hence the exten-
sion) is signed, attacks require the modification of settings on the signer
and/or verifier machine. The use of a special association table, used only
by the signature program, will prevent such changes being made acciden-
tally. However, no system can completely address threats which arise if
attackers have access to the signer or verifier computer, and thus users of
signatures should take all the usual precautions to protect the integrity of
their computers.
5.4.2 Changes to documents
In order to sign a digital document, the user views the document on the
screen, approves it for signature, and finally requests the digital signature
program to sign it. However, a threat exists that the document could be
changed after the user views it and before the document is signed. For
instance, just after viewing the document and before signing it, a piece of
malicious code could change the document.
This issue can be addressed by integrating the digital signature func-
tionality into the application itself, instead of separating the viewing and
signing functions. An application may provide both facilities to the user;
for instance, the application may enable the user to view the document, ap-
prove it for signature, and have the signature generated (e.g. using a system
function call) without switching to any other application.
Of course, this problem arises with any scheme designed to sign docu-
ments, independently of the solution described in this paper. Again, this
underlines the importance of protecting the integrity of any computer used
to create digital signatures.
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6 Concluding remarks
The suggested solution requires all document handling applications to pos-
sess application awareness of the digital signature program in order to func-
tion properly. Every application must implement a COM interface and
register itself in the Registry, in a location specific to the digital signa-
ture program, to enable the digital signature program to sign the digital
document. We conclude this document by discussing one possible area for
possible future research.
In order to sign a digital document, the user private key should be ac-
cessible to the digital signature program. Securing the user private key
is very important to the operation of the suggested solution and, indeed,
to any implementation of digital signatures. Where should this key be
stored? The use of trusted computing technology (Balacheff et al. 2003),
as incorporated into Microsoft’s Next Generation Secure Computing Base
(NGSCB) (England et al. 2003), may be useful in this context. Further
research in this area is required in order to answer such questions.
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